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 BHUTAN-CHINA RELATIONS: TOWARDS A NEW STEP IN 
HIMALAYAN POLITICS 
THIERRY MATHOU∗
here is an apparent paradox in Bhutan-China’s relationship. The 
geographical location of Bhutan gives it both political and strategic 
importance in the Himalayan region. Bhutan has a long tradition of 
cultural and religious interaction with Tibet and shares a common border 
with China. Yet, the kingdom is China’s only neighbour which does not 
have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Even trade and economic contacts between the two countries are very 
small and their common border remains closed.  
T
However, the status quo resulting from the turmoil that followed 
the integration of Tibet in the PRC and the Sino-Indian border conflict in 
1962 is about to change. Political contacts have been resumed since the 
mid 1980s. The two governments have been using the annual border 
consultations to exchange views on a wide range of bilateral issues. Both 
countries have interest in the normalization of their relationship. Yet, 
their perspectives are different. While Bhutan prefers to remain cautious 
according to the approach it has always favoured on the diplomatic 
scene1, China is considering its relation with Bhutan as part of its 
“Western development strategy”, that could allow Tibet to regain a 
central position in the Himalayan region. 
The present paper places Bhutan-China relations in an historical 
perspective that shows the importance of the Tibetan factor. Linkage 
politics and perceptions of security in the context of India-China relations 
are also described. Though a sign of further détente in the region, the 
perspectives of normalization of Bhutan-China relations open a new step 
in Himalayan politics.  
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The Historical Perspective 
Bhutan and Ancient Tibet 
Historically, Chinese claims to Bhutan had been totally dependant 
upon Tibetan claims2. For that reason, the Bhutan-Tibet relationship must 
be addressed in the first place. There are several cultural, social and 
religious similarities between Bhutanese and Tibetans, who have had 
many interactions for a long time. Tibetan influence had been a decisive 
factor in the evolution of Bhutan’s social and political structures. 
In the early 8th century, when Tibet was a military power, Tibetan 
armies invaded Bhutan. Tibetan lamas also arrived in the Southern 
Valleys3 where some Tibetans settled down and intermarried with local 
people. People of Tibetan origin became predominant in the western part 
of Bhutan. During the 9th century, Tibetan armies withdrew from Bhutan, 
but lamas kept on coming intermittently to Bhutan where they exercised 
both spiritual and temporal authority. These migrations were decisive in 
the conversion of the local people to Buddhism. Since that period, Tibet 
has remained a sacred land for most Bhutanese.  
However, the most significant interaction between Tibet and Bhutan 
dates back to the arrival in Bhutan in 1616 of Zhabdrung Ngawang 
Namgyal, the prince-abbot of Ralung monastery. At that time, Bhutan 
had already social, economic and religious structures imported from 
Tibet. Trade had helped organize relations between different valleys as 
shown by iron-chain suspension bridges built by Thangtong Gyalpo, a 
famous Tibetan saint, who visited Bhutan during the 15th century. At that 
time Bhutan was not a unified country. Ngawang Namgyal, a refugee 
forced out from Tibet by the Tsangpa and Gelugpa rulers of Tibet, 
unified Bhutan. He secured his control over the western region and 
extended his power eastward. He successfully contended with local 
rulers, rival lamas and Tibetan troops that unsuccessfully kept on 
invading the Southern Valleys in the mid 17th century. Among his major 
achievements was the building of dzong, the fortified monasteries 
strategically located in the main valleys that serve both as centres of local 
government and administration and as state monasteries even today. 
Despite the changes that occurred after the establishment of the 
Zhabdrung system, warfare remained the normal condition between 
                                                          
2 See for instance “Yin Zi Xizang Tong Zhi, Shi Ba Shiji De Zhongguo Yu Budan De Guanxi” 
(General Register of Tibet. Relations between China and Bhutan, in the 18th century), p. 510-511, 
and “Xiao Fang Hu Zai Di Cong Cao” Volume III, “Kuoerka Budan Hekao” (Studies on Kuoerka 
Bhutan), Edited by Nan Qing He Wang, Author: Gong Chai from Ningbo. (Social Sciences 
Academy of China, Institute of Ethnological and Anthroplological Studies, Beijing). 
3 The term “Southern Valleys" refers to one of Bhutan's early name in Tibetan language (Lho Jong), 
when Bhutan was not a unified country, but only a territory located South of Tibet. 
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Bhutan and Tibet during the 17th and 18th centuries. The Gelugpa (yellow-
hat)-dominated political system in Tibet intended to establish its 
authority over the entire Buddhist world in the Himalayas, while Drukpa 
(red-hat) Bhutan sought to resist. In 1731 the Tibetan ruler Polhane took 
the opportunity of Bhutan’s internal turmoil to impose suzerainty on the 
Southern Valleys. Although Tibet occasionally claimed a legitimate right 
to interfere in local politics, there is no evidence of Tibet ever having 
practically implemented its rule in Bhutan.  
The advent of the British East India Company on Bhutan’s southern 
borders in the mid-18th century created a new situation. Bhutan and Tibet 
had similar concern that led to some degree of co-operation. After its 
defeat in the Anglo-Bhutan war over Kuch Bihar (1772-1773), Bhutan was 
forced to arrange the first British mission into Tibet. Thanks to Bhutanese 
authorities, Lt. George Bogle, who led the mission, visited the Panchen 
Lama in Shigatse. Bhutan was clearly perceived by the British as a trade 
and political channel to Tibet. From the advent of the monarchy in 
Bhutan in 1907 and the signing of Punakha Treaty in 1910, under which 
the Kingdom accepted British guidance of its foreign relations, to the 
independence of India in 1947, relations between Bhutan and Tibet 
continued, but under British influence both in Lhasa and Punakha. 
It is clear from the above that Bhutan had a close, although often 
conflicting, relation with Tibet, including in the political field. Yet, these 
relations were mainly of cultural and religious nature. Tibet’s rulers 
certainly considered Bhutan as a vassal. Occasionally, Bhutan even 
pretended to accept that situation in order to play down British influence. 
In 1946 for instance, the King of Bhutan wrote to the Viceroy and 
Governor General of India that Bhutan was very close to Tibet and that it 
had "acknowledged Tibetan sovereignty" up to 18604. Some evidence 
could confirm such an interpretation. An annual payment to Tibet was 
due in recognition of its alleged suzerainty over Bhutan, and a Bhutanese 
representative was posted in Lhasa up to 1959 as part of a tributary 
relation. However the traditional Tibet-Bhutan relationship should not be 
interpreted in terms of "a superior/inferior syndrome, supposedly 
involving some form of Bhutanese vassalage to Tibet. The political elite of 
Bhutan may have been largely Tibetan in origin, but all of their ancestors 
came to Bhutan as political refugees and not as feudatories. Tibetan 
migration to Bhutan did not constitute colonization nor did it constitute 
an extension of Tibetan political authority into new lands in south of the 
                                                          
4 Srikant Dutt, "Bhutan's International Position", in International Studies, New Delhi, vol.20, n°3-4 
, July-December 1981, 604. And Parmanand, “The Politics of Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect”, 
Pragati Publications, New Delhi, 1992, p.160 
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Himalayan range”5. While the formal political relationship between the 
two countries can be described as independent, their religious and 
cultural relationship is more ambiguous. They both had theocratic 
political systems, the coexistence of which was misleading. Yet the 
situation was quite clear. “As the most prestigious of Buddhist 
reincarnates, the Dalai Lama received the greatest degree of respect and 
deference, but the gifts made to him by the Zhabdrung were not tributes. 
The most conclusive evidence of the limitations of Tibetan government 
influence in Bhutan is that no monastic institutions of the Dalai Lama’s 
Gelugpa sect were ever allowed in Bhutan. Somewhat more complicated 
were the relations between the dominant Drukpa sect in Bhutan and its 
mother monastery in Tibet – Ralung. There was an implicit 
superior/inferior status in their traditional relation, but because the 
Drukpa sect was a subordinate sect in a Gelugpa-dominated political 
system in Tibet, this situation never created any political tutelage over 
Bhutan”6.  
 
Bhutan and China Before 1949  
Although Tibet had long constituted a threat to Bhutan’s 
independence, the relationship between the two neighbours had been 
managed smoothly in the past. The insertion of a dominant Chinese 
influence in Lhasa in the late eighteenth century could have been a far 
more serious concern for Punakha, then the capital of Bhutan. Bhutan’s 
geopolitical situation was made even more precarious by the coincidence 
between the expansion of Chinese influence in Tibet and the intrusion of 
British rule in North-Eastern India. Yet direct relations between Bhutan 
and China remained minimal.  
These relations started after the establishment of the Chinese 
Ambans (residents) in Lhasa in the 18th century under the Qing dynasty. 
Chinese sources tend to indicate that Bhutan was a vassal of China. This 
assumption was based on the Tibetan ruler Polhane’s alleged suzerainty 
on Bhutan that was supposed to have been passed on to Tibet’s Chinese 
overlord. Chinese agents in Lhasa regularly echoed the sentiment that 
Nepal, Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan all formed parts of the Chinese empire. 
There were a few instances in the 18th and 19th centuries when Chinese 
emperors bestowed patents of office upon various Bhutanese officials, 
including the Deb Raja7. Such actions, while unilateral, had no political 
consequences. Bhutanese never considered these symbols as proof of any 
                                                          
5 Leo E. Rose, "The Politics of Bhutan", Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1977, p.58 
6 Leo E. Rose, 60-61 
7 Also known as "Druk Desi", the Deb Raja was the secular regent under the Zhabdrung system in 
Bhutan. 
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kind of suzerainty. A Bhutanese representative was posted in Lhasa 
where he regularly met Tibetan and occasionally Chinese officials. But 
there were no Bhutanese missions to Beijing similar to those sent 
periodically by Nepal which the Chinese records described as “tributary” 
in character. The Bhutanese missions went only to the Dalaï Lama, and 
while they usually called on the Chinese Ambans in Lhasa, no letters or 
gifts were forwarded to the emperor in Beijing, not, at least, on a regular 
basis. The courtesy gifts to the Dalai Lama, or even the Amban had no 
political significance. In 1900 the Bhutanese even rebuffed Ma Chifu, an 
envoy of the Chinese Amban with a pre-emptory letter8.  
Bhutan was probably concerned by the joint Chinese/Tibetan 
invasion of Nepal in 1792-1793. The Chinese commander, Fu Kang-an, 
requested the Bhutanese to assist him in his war against Nepal. Despite 
Punakha’s refusal and Fu’s protestation, no action was taken against 
Bhutan9. There are records of Chinese interventions in Bhutan in 1830, 
1876, 1885, 1889 and 190510. In February 1910, the Manchu government of 
China laid claim to Bhutan along with Nepal and Sikkim. Direct contacts 
between the two countries were also recorded under the Guomindang 
regime in 1940, 1943 and1947. However, none of these contacts was 
politically substantial nor they proved any kind of subordination.  
 
The China Factor in India-Bhutan’s Relations 
The Emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) : 1949-1962 
The PRC has been keen to have good relations with Bhutan 
regardless of the status of Tibet. Beijing rapidly put aside the alleged 
Chinese historical sovereignty over Bhutan and preferred to use 
diplomacy rather than force. Indeed, Mao Zedong had been influenced 
by historical considerations. In 1930, he “openly declared that the correct 
boundaries of China would include Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Taiwan, 
Korea and Ryukyu Island. These remarks were contained in the original 
version of the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party11, but were 
deleted from the later versions of the book with a view to avoid 
suspicions in the minds of the leaders of these countries”12. China might 
have been interested in extending its influence on the southern range of 
the Himalayas, while secretly supporting the formation of a Himalayan 
                                                          
8 Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "Return of the Dragon-I: Bhutan prepares to talk to China", The 
Statesman, new Delhi, 17 July 1981 
9 Leo E. Rose, 62 
10 Srikant Dutt, 'Scholarship on Bhutan", China report, vol.17, n°5, September-October 1981 
11 Current Background, U.S. Consulate General, Hong-Kong, n°135.  
12 K.P.S. Menon, China: Past and Present, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1968, 21, Parmanand, 
163 
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Federation including Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan13. But this project was 
rapidly abandoned. After consolidating its control over Tibet, that made 
the PRC Bhutan’s de facto neighbour, Beijing, who was fully aware of the 
Bhutan-Indian treaty of 1949, was even keener to treat Bhutan as an 
independent state. In 1953, Chinese gifts were sent to the Druk Gyalpo 
(King of Bhutan). In 1955, Chinese officers in Lhasa even decided to issue 
visas directly to Bhutanese citizens. Bhutan was also interested by a 
better relation with China. But the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) 
never took any specific initiatives. Contacts existed but remained of 
casual nature14. Bhutan remained cautious if not suspicious as far as 
Chinese intentions were concerned. In 1958 there were some rumours 
about the discovery, in the Tawang district in Northeast India, of a 
reincarnation of the Zhabdrung, a potential challenger to the Bhutanese 
monarchy. Some unsubstantiated reports even mentioned that this 
reincarnation was brought to Tibet where Bhutanese opposed to the King 
tried to win support from China against the Bhutanese monarchy.  
The outbreak of a revolt against the Chinese in Tibet in 1954-1955 
had direct consequences on Sino-Bhutan relations in the general 
framework of growing tension between China and India. One of the 
Khampa rebellion’s strongholds was located in the area of Tsona, in 
Central Tibet, not far from the Bhutan border. It was in that context that 
Nehru decided to make a visit to Bhutan in September 1958 in order to 
convince the Royal Government of Bhutan to end its isolation policy. 
Planning the construction of a strategic road between India and Bhutan 
was one of Delhi’s priorities in the region. Despite its own concern over 
the situation in Tibet, Bhutan was cautious not to be dragged into the 
emerging big-neighbours confrontation. Consequently the RGOB was in 
favour of a wait-and-see policy. However the rapidly deteriorating 
situation in the North made it more and more difficult for Bhutan to 
resist Indian solicitations. In 1959, the PRC occupied eight Bhutanese 
enclaves in western Tibet. In 1959, the Dalaï Lama escaped to India 
through the Chumbi valley directly adjacent to Bhutan on the East. Large 
numbers of Tibetan refugees started to pour into Bhutan. The 
descriptions they made about Chinese misconduct in Tibet had a strong 
impact on the Bhutanese.  
Bhutan tried to resist the outside pressure. The King was fully aware 
of the strategic position of his country. He understood the Indian 
                                                          
13 Manorama Kohli, "Bhutan's Strategic environment: Changing Perceptions", India Quarterly, 
New Delhi, vol.42, n°2, April-June1986 
14 During the 1960s a Bhutanese lama was stationed in Tibet in an informal capacity. Members of 
the influential Dorji family while in exile in Hong Kong and Kathmandu were said to have 
contacts with Chinese representatives. (Parmanand, 164) 
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approach. Yet he insisted that Bhutan was not an Indian protectorate and 
that the 1949 treaty did not contain any clause relating to defence. In 
1960, he referred to Bhutan’s relations with China as “friendly and 
peaceful”. In 1961, he indicated that Bhutan did not “want to be either 
friend or enemy of China”15.  
During the Spring of 1960, the Chinese offensive was brought 
directly to Tsona district. By the end of 1960 Chinese border guards were 
reported to patrol along the frontier. Some of them even made small-scale 
incursions into Bhutanese territory. Although these incursions did not 
reveal any military intention from the Chinese, they demonstrated the 
uncertainty on their part as to the actual location of the border. In 1961, 
the publication of a new map depicting China’s version of the border 
along the entire Himalayan frontier showed several discrepancies with 
previous maps, and potential territorial disputes. A controversial map 
had been already published in July 1958 in the China Pictorial magazine 
denoting large tracts of Bhutanese territory - the entire Trashigang area in 
the east and a substantial portion of territory in the Northeast - belonging 
to China. These discrepancies received a large publicity in India. New 
Delhi increased its pressure for the opening of Bhutan that was 
considered as one of the most vulnerable sectors in the Indian security 
system.  
Eventually, Bhutan accepted to reply to Indian request. Various 
economic-aid agreements were signed between the two countries, 
including the planning of a major road project linking India to central 
Bhutan. The Indian Army was formally entrusted with a responsibility of 
training the Royal Bhutan Army that was a de facto included in the 
Indian security system. In 1960, several months before India did the 
same, Bhutan decided a total ban on trade with Tibet. Bhutan withdrew 
its representative in Lhasa and its officer in western Tibet. The embargo 
had decisive influence on the Bhutanese economy, which had long 
depended upon the Tibetan market, and was forced to adjust to the 
global shifting of trade structures that followed the opening of the road to 
India in 1963. It meant closing all the traditional outlets for the country’s 
surplus rice and depriving weavers around the Bumthang area with 
Tibetan wool. 
During that period, China’s policy toward Bhutan varied from 
intimidation to seduction. China was reported to have offered economic 
assistance to Bhutan that preferred not to respond. On several occasions, 
Beijing tried to convince Thimphu that China had no aggressive 
intentions against Bhutan and that it was prepared to settle the border 
                                                          
15 “Borders of Bhutan: Peking’s bid for direct talks”. The Hindu, New Delhi, January 31, 1961. 
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dispute through direct negotiations. Beijing had no intention to involve 
Delhi in solving that issue. Although Bhutan considered that its 
acceptance of the guidance of India on its external relations, under the 
1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty, did not prevent direct discussions with 
China, the situation prevailing in the region was not in favour of such 
policy. Bhutan preferred the issues in dispute with China to be raised in 
the Sino-Indian border talks held in 1961. Yet these issues were never 
discussed as Beijing refused to include them in its discussions with Delhi. 
Premier Chou Enlai only mentioned in one of his communications to 
Nehru that China wanted to “live together in friendship with Bhutan 
without committing aggression against each other”16. 
 
Bhutan and the 1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict  
The tension between India and China eventually erupted into a 
border war in October 1962. Although Bhutan did not take part in this 
war, its territory was adjacent to the battlefield. Decisive combats took 
place in the Kameng district in NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency), just 
on the east of Bhutan. The RGOB was fully aware that an extension of the 
conflict could easily involve its territory. A strategic pass formed by a 
trans-Himalayan tributary of the Manas river, located on the Tibet-
Bhutan border in Kameng district, was essential to Chinese strategy, 
should Beijing decide to continue military operations in NEFA. 
Fortunately for Bhutan, the war was brief. Chinese offensives were 
decisive. Indian forces were rapidly overwhelmed and had to retreat 
through the Trashigang area on Bhutanese territory. Eventually, China 
decided a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its forces north of the main 
Himalayan range. This decision came as a relief for Bhutan.  
Although brief, this war had important consequences in the power 
balance in the Himalayas. Bhutan could have reassessed some aspects of 
its diplomacy in the region. It was clear since the 1950s that China had 
not renounced to have direct influence in the southern Himalayas. While 
India had implicitly recognised China's sovereignty over Tibet in 1954, 
China criticised the close-up between Sikkim and India and encouraged 
Nepal's dual diplomacy. After the Sino-Indian conflict, some in 
Bhutanese elite circles, especially in the National Assembly, seemed to be 
in favour of a balanced diplomacy between India and China. Such 
diplomacy was supposed to be based on an equal friendship with Delhi 
and Beijing forged on the Nepali model. The RGOB however did not 
even consider this option, at least for three reasons. Bhutan was more 
sensitive than Nepal regarding the fate of Tibet. Common socio-religious 
                                                          
16 Parmanand, 164. 
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origins with Tibetans and historical factors made Bhutanese highly 
concerned with Chinese strategy in the Himalayas. Bhutan and Nepal 
had different treaty relations with India. Bhutan was also very critical 
regarding the so-called Nepali model. “Nepal had succeeded in creating 
a more positive international image abroad. But much of this was a 
mirage, as later developments demonstrated, and the price paid both 
politically and economically was very high”. Bhutan refused to become 
an arena of big-power competition. It “believed that it could attain as 
positive results in a more gradual and less dramatic approach. The 
Bhutanese foreign-policy strategy was based upon the assumption that 
New Delhi would not obstruct the gradual expansion of Bhutan’s 
relations with the outside world if this could be accomplished without 
undermining India’s regional and security interests”17. Later 
developments proved Bhutan’s option to be valid. Bhutan joined several 
international organisations including the United Nations, with Indian 
support, and pursued a cautious but pragmatic and effective diplomacy. 
As far as relations with Beijing were concerned, Thimphu preferred the 
status quo and chose to await the improvement in Indo-China relations 
to reassess its China policy.  
 
Linkage Politics and Perceptions of Security 
Although risks of direct confrontation rapidly disappeared after the 
end of the Sino-Indian conflict, Bhutan remained cautious during the 
1960s vis-à-vis China. There were reports of China building roads and 
setting up military installations in border areas. Traditional grazing, 
along the Chumbi valley, formerly a Sikkimese possession, where yak 
and cattle follow the pasture, created friction between Bhutanese and 
Tibetan herdsmen. Although unsubstantiated, rumours about an alleged 
involvement of pro-Chinese elements in the assassination of the 
Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji also circulated in 1964.  
 
The spirit of détente in the early 1970s influenced to some extent 
Bhutan’s China policy. With India feeling responsible for the protection 
of the borders of Bhutan, the kingdom had better wait for the 
improvement in Sino-India relations. The RGOB had strong reservations 
concerning possible interactions with China. Yet pragmatism 
commended some form of normalisation between the two countries. 
Bhutan had to solve very practical issues. The first related to the formal 
delimitation of the 200-miles Sino-Bhutan border. The boundary had 
never been demarcated in the past. Officials and local people had a clear 
                                                          
17 Leo E. Rose, 82 
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understanding of territory limits only for areas adjacent to major pass 
traditionally used by traders. The rest of the frontier was largely 
unknown and nobody has expressed any interest for the demarcation of 
territorial jurisdictions prior to 1959. It is precisely in these unknown 
areas where difficulties arose during the 1960s. High-altitude 
pasturelands located on the border were periodically the cause of 
disputes between Bhutanese and Tibetan herders. Such disputes were not 
only of a casual nature. Beijing’s policy in the Himalayan frontier region 
was to claim disputed areas on the basis of usage by Tibetans. China 
periodically indicated that it was ready to reach a boundary settlement 
with Bhutan through direct bilateral negotiations. Although Bhutan 
could agree with this objective, its treaty commitments to India made the 
Chinese approach infeasible before a complete normalisation of Sino-
Indian relations.  
 
Bhutan and the Tibetan Question 
Apart from the Indian factor, the Tibetan question is an important 
element to be considered in the perspective of an evolution of the 
relations between Bhutan and the PRC. In some respects, the complexity 
of the relations between Bhutan and ancient Tibet has survived through 
the ages. The Drukpa sect has remained totally independent from the 
Gelugpa establishment. The relations between Bhutan and the Tibetans in 
exile must be addressed in that context. Bhutan’s policy towards Tibetan 
refugees has not been designed in order to fit Chinese interests. The 
Chinese authorities however have all reasons to be satisfied with the 
RGOB's policy that exclude all kind of official contacts with Dharamsala. 
Surprisingly enough, the Dalaï Lama, who travels a lot, has never visited 
Bhutan. As the only Mahayana Buddhist state in the world, with strong 
cultural, religious and historical links with ancient Tibet, Bhutan has 
sympathy for modern Tibet. However the RGOB has never advocated a 
pro-active policy on the international scene in favour of the Tibetan 
question. 
Tibetan refugees, including a few with marital ties to prominent 
Bhutanese families, who started pouring into Bhutan from 1959, were 
first welcomed in the Kingdom. Cultural and religious relations 
facilitated their installation. The RGOB even distributed land. During the 
1960s, the Tibetan community prospered in Bhutan. Several Tibetans 
started businesses and opened shops in Thimphu, Trongsa, Trashigang 
and Bumthang. In 1973 the Tibetan community in Bhutan represented 
approximately 6,300 refugees. There were eleven Tibetan monasteries in 
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Bhutan18. Difficulties began in the late 1960s. The situation became critical 
during the mid 1970s19. Tibetans became a factor in domestic politics and 
were regularly suspected to have helped foment some of Bhutan’s 
internal upheavals. Although they respected Bhutan’s political and 
religious institutions, their primary allegiance was towards the Dalaï 
Lama. From the RGOB point of view, the risk was real to see Bhutan 
become a shelter for Tibetan political activists who could use the 
Bhutanese territory to back up actions against China. Suspicion was 
nurtured by the influence of Tibetans in business circles and in the 
entourage of the King that created resentment and jealousy. That 
situation coincided with an atmosphere of conspiracy that prevailed on 
the internal scene20. The arrival of new refugees forced the RGOB to take 
action in order to clarify the situation of the Tibetans in Bhutan. Refugees 
were pouring into Bhutan in numbers quite beyond the capacity of the 
RGOB to handle. In 1979, the National Assembly decided that Tibetans 
who had arrived in Bhutan after 1959, had to choose between becoming 
Bhutanese citizens and leaving the country. About 2,300 people accepted 
to make allegiance to the Druk Gyalpo and therefore became Bhutanese 
citizens. The situation of the remaining 4,000 refugees proved to be a 
difficult question to be solved. In the early 1980s, the Dalaï Lama 
regularly touched this issue while visiting Western countries. Some 
members of the National Assembly proposed to expel refugees who 
refused to become Bhutanese. Such a drastic solution was not consistent 
with Bhutan’s principles and tradition. Therefore, the RGOB preferred to 
negotiate their departure with India. Half of the refugees eventually 
settled in India, while the others scattered in the west, mainly in Europe 
and North America. Since that period, the Tibetan question did not 
surface in international politics. 
 
Bhutan and the People’s Republic of China: Towards Normalisation 
First Official Contacts 
The establishment of official contacts between Bhutan and the PRC 
has been a slow and cautious process. In 1971, Bhutan joined the United 
Nations and voted in favour of giving to the PRC the Chinese seat in the 
                                                          
18 Tibetans in exile, Information Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, 1981 
19 Kuensel, February 29, 1976. 
20 The family of Yangki, the once influential Tibetan mistress of the late king, was allegedly 
associated with the assassination of the Prime Minister in 1964. In 1974, a Tibetan connection (that 
could have included the Dalaï Lama’s own brother) was also suspected to be part of a plot to 
murder the King. None of these allegations however, have been proved so far.  
Thierry Mathou, Bhutan; dernier royaume bouddhiste de l'Himalaya, Editions Kailash, Paris, 1998, 
172. 
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UN. Both countries had occasions to interact with each other, through 
their mission to the UN in New York. 
In 1974, China, along with few other countries21, was invited to the 
coronation of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck. It was a unique 
opportunity for Bhutan to assert its personality on the international 
scene. The Chinese delegation was led by Ma Muming, chargé d’affaires 
and interim of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. Ma’s visit to Thimphu 
was described by Xinhua News Agency as a “new page in the friendly 
contacts between the two countries”. The Chinese congratulatory 
message emphasised the “desire of the Bhutanese government in 
developing its economy and safeguarding its national independence”22. 
The invitation of a Chinese delegation in Thimphu was a clear message 
showing that Bhutan was ready to normalise its relations with China, 
assuming that India had agreed with that process. A few years later in 
1977 and 1979, the visit to China of the Bhutanese ping-pong team 
provided other opportunities of interaction.  
In 1974 Bhutan’s Survey Department examined claims and historical 
records. In 1976, the National Assembly began discussing the boundary 
issue and the prospects of negotiation. Although steps made during the 
70s were significant in order to create a favourable atmosphere with 
China, Bhutan had to still adjust its initiative to Sino-Indian relations. A 
first and positive signal came in 1979 when the Janata government in 
New Delhi, promoted its policy of “beneficial bilateralism” that paved 
the way of a normalisation of relations between India and the PRC. At 
that time members of the National Assembly in Thimphu pleaded for the 
establishment of direct contacts with China. Their request was not 
inspired by a pro-China stand. It was merely motivated by the growing 
number of grazing incidents on the Sino-Bhutan border. In 1979 
intrusions were found to be on a larger scale than in former years, and 
the need for negotiation became urgent. It was precisely that year that 
Bhutanese and Chinese leaders started to exchange annually 
congratulatory messages on the occasion of National Days. Although it 
was a formal protocol such practice symbolised a new step in Bhutan-
China relations. 
Thimphu did not consider that its move towards China had to be 
submitted to a formal authorisation from New Delhi. Yet the RGOB was 
keen enough to inform India. Incidentally, the official announcement of 
Bhutan’s intention to have direct and bilateral discussions with China on 
border issues was made by the Bhutanese foreign Minister, Lyonpo 
                                                          
21 The only representatives allowed to attend the crowning ceremony were those of Bangladesh, 
China, India, Sikkim, the Soviet Union, and the United States. 
22 Parmanand, 169 
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Dawa Tsering, in June 1981, after a visit in Thimphu by the Indian 
Minister for External Affairs V.P. Narashima Rao, and before a visit in 
New Delhi of the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua. In 1983, Chinese 
State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and Bhutanese 
Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering met in New York and held consultations 
on developing bilateral relations.  
 
The Boundary Issue 
The first round of talks on the boundary issue was held in Beijing in 
April 1984. From 1984 to 2002, Bhutan and China have had sixteen such 
rounds, alternatively in Beijing and in Thimphu. The 16th was held in 
Beijing in October 2002. From the 1st to the 5th round of talks, the 
Bhutanese delegation was led by the ambassador in New Delhi, while the 
Chinese delegation was headed by a Vice Foreign Minister. Subsequently 
the level of the talks was upgraded. Starting with the 6th round of talks in 
1989, the Bhutanese side was led by the Foreign Minister, and the 
Chinese side by a Senior Vice Foreign Minister. More recently the 
involvement of heads of state and government has added solemnity to 
the process. When in Thimphu, the Chinese delegation is granted an 
audience with the King. While in Beijing, the Bhutanese delegation has a 
meeting with the Prime Minister. 
Progress has been slow. During the first ten rounds of talks, both 
sides “have reached consensus on the guiding principles on the 
settlement of the boundary issues and narrowed their differences”23. In 
1996, the Survey of Bhutan had reported that the Chinese were 
constructing roads and started logging operations in the areas under 
discussion. Bhutan expressed its concern over these developments at the 
11th round of talks in Beijing in 1996. The Chinese at that time had 
proposed that the two sides sign an agreement of friendship between 
them. But since the Bhutanese delegation had no authority to do so, it 
was postponed to the 12th round of talks in Beijing on December 8, 1998. 
On that date, Bhutan and China signed an “Agreement on Maintenance 
of Peace and Tranquillity in Bhutan-China Border Areas”24. This was an 
important step not only for border talks but also for the global relation 
between the two countries, which signed their first ever inter-
governmental agreement. Bhutan and China agreed that prior to the 
ultimate solution of the boundary issues, “the status quo of the boundary 
                                                          
23 "Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Bhutan on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Along the Sino-Bhutanese 
Border Areas", December 8, 1998, Article 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, Beijing. 
24 See Appendix for the full text of that agreement.  
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prior to March 1959 should be upheld”. China reaffirmed that it 
“completely respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Bhutan. Both sides stand ready to develop their good-
neighbourly and friendly co-operative relations on the basis of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence.” Despite remarks from Indian 
scholars relaying protests from some leaders of the Bhutanese opposition 
who pointed out “Bhutan’s playing of China-card against India”, this 
agreement did not seem to provoke much discomfort in New Delhi. 
Obviously, the primary objective of the annual talks has been to find 
a solution to the boundary issues. In 1959 one of the disputed territory 
was identified as covering an area of about 600 square kilometres, located 
in the northeast of Bhutan along the Mac-Mahon line25. It included the 
Tashigang area and corresponded only to the eastern sector. At that time, 
the Chinese requests were very vague, and were not well documented. 
They became more accurate after 1962. Disputed territories also included 
enclaves26 identified by the name of nine villages located on the west 
bank of the Nyamjang Chhu27: Khangri, Tarcheng, Checkar, Jangtong, 
Tussu, Janghi, Dirafoo, Chakop, and Kachan. The exact extent of the 
disputed territory has not been publicised. It is only recently that more 
detailed information has been released through debates at the National 
Assembly in Thimphu. According to debates that took place in July 2002 
there were basically four disputed areas: “Starting from Doklam in the 
west the border goes along the ridges from Gamochen to Batangla, 
Sinchela, and down to the Amo Chhu. The disputed area in Doklam 
covered 89 square kilometres. The disputed areas in Sinchulumpa and 
Gieu covered about 180 sq. km. The boundary line in this area starts from 
Langmarpo Zam and goes along the stream up to Docherimchang and up 
the ridge to Gomla from where it goes along the ridge to Pangkala and 
then down to the Dramana stream. From Dramana, the boundary goes 
up to Zingula and then follows the ridgeline down to Gieu Chhu from 
where it goes to Lungkala. In the middle sector in Pasamlum, the 
boundary goes along the ridge to Dompala and to Neula. From Neula, 
the boundary follows the ridge line to Kuricchu Tshozam, and then 
follows the ridge line to Genla from where it goes to Mela and onwards 
to the east”28. As a result of the talks, the disputed territory had been 
reduced from 1,128 sq.km to 269 sq.km in three areas in the north-
western part of Bhutan. After the interim agreement was signed in 1998, 
the “Chinese government had responded immediately to the problem of 
                                                          
25 Asian Recorder 19-25 September 1959 
26 These enclaves were supposed to be Bhutanese territory since the 17th century. 
27 Asian recorder 3-9 December 1960 
28 Kuensel, July 5, 2002 (80th National Assembly debates) 
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the mule track and timber extraction in Pasamlum. The agreement also 
helped settle the complaints that Tibetans crossing into Bhutan searching 
for medicinal herbs, were given severe and unwarranted punishment at 
Pasamlum by the Bhutanese border security”29. 
The Chinese approach on border talks with Bhutan has been quite 
similar to the one it had taken earlier with Nepal, and has proposed once 
to India on the Sino-Indian boundary, with preference for a “package 
deal” rather than a sector-by-sector settlement. Although discussions 
have progressed since the signing of 1998 agreement, Bhutan has been 
reluctant to precipitate the conclusion of the negotiation as new concerns 
arose.  
During the 14th round of talks held in Beijing in November 2000, 
Bhutan extended the claim line of the border beyond what the Chinese 
government had initially offered. The proposed extension of the border 
along the three sectors under discussion were in Doglam, Sinchulumba 
and Dramana areas. The RGOB “had felt that the earlier agreement was 
not acceptable to Bhutan and felt that some changes had to be made in 
the claims”30. During the 15th round of talks, held in Thimphu in 
December 2001, the Chinese negotiator, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
said that the “boundary issue had, by and large, been resolved”. The 
Bhutan side mentioned “considerable progress”. At the end of 2001, it 
was generally admitted that the “discussion was close to final 
resolution”31.  
In July 2002 however, the Bhutanese Foreign Minister Lyonpo Jigmi 
Y. Thinley told the National Assembly that the Chinese had “claimed to 
have documentary evidence on the ownership of the disputed tracts of 
land. When Bhutan asked them to be generous with a small neighbour 
like Bhutan they said that, as a nation which shared its border with 25 
other countries they could not afford to be generous with one particular 
neighbour. The Chinese government, including the Prime Minister, were 
unhappy and questioned why Bhutan was raising new issues after many 
years of talks”32. Although no details have been released regarding these 
“new issues”, it is clear from debates in the National Assembly, that 
Bhutan still has serious concern regarding some aspects of the border 
issue. The western sector has been the most debated. It is not only a 
question of technical delimitation but also a security issue. The vicinity of 
the China-India border has to be taken in account. Members of the 
National Assembly have expressed their concern about “the existence of 
                                                          
29 Kuensel, July 5, 2002 (80th National Assembly debates) 
30 Kuensel, July 5, 2002 (80th National Assembly debates) 
31 Kuensel, November 3, 2001, p.6 
32 Kuensel, July 5, 2002 (80th National Assembly debates) 
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Chinese military camps in the disputed regions in the western part of the 
country”. Although there are no direct links between border talks with 
China and militant insurgency in the south, the issue is of particular 
importance considering the current security problems on Bhutan’s 
southern border with India, which provoked angry reaction and 
suspicion in the National Assembly.33 During its last session, the National 
Assembly also expressed concerns over the regular encroachment into 
Bhutanese pasture land by herdsmen from Tibet, which has become a 
recurrent problem. 
As noticed by the Bhutanese Foreign Minister himself, “the Chinese 
side has been keen to go beyond Bhutan’s setback”34, which proves 
Beijing interest and willingness in normalising its relations with 
Thimphu. After the 16th round of talks, the Bhutanese side conceded that 
the “subject matter was rather complex, so both sides would continue to 
work towards finding a solution”35. It was agreed therefore to bring 
technical experts to decide which part of the territory was Bhutanese and 
which part was Chinese and to depict the claims on a map. Both sides 
decided to use common names of the disputed areas to avoid confusion. 
In June 2002, the Bhutanese Home Secretary led an expert team to China 
for the first meeting of the expert group. Technical discussions have to be 
pursued. The next round of border talks is to be held in Thimphu during 
the Fall 2003. 
 
Bilateral Relations 
Sixteen rounds of talks have proved so far that Bhutan and China 
are capable of dealing with a mature relation. Official contacts between 
the two countries have been growing through both direct and 
multilateral channels. The two countries have been using the annual 
consultations to exchange views on ways to expand bilateral relations. 
Chinese authorities have regularly expounded the basic principles of 
their policy towards Bhutan, expressing that “China cherishes the 
traditional friendship between the two people, attaches importance to the 
friendly relations between the two countries, respects Bhutan’s 
independence and sovereignty, and adheres to the principle of non-
interference in Bhutan’s internal affairs”. China has been hoping “to 
gradually increase bilateral contacts, and welcome Bhutanese friends to 
China to do business, to carry on observations, to make pilgrimages or to 
                                                          
33 In 2000, sources from Assamese press suggested that arms had been supplied to the rebels in 
Southern Bhutan, from China, inter alia, through Burma and via Chittagong port in Bangladesh. 
Yet these allegations have not been documented. 
34 Kuensel, July 5, 2002 (80th National Assembly debates) 
35 Kuensel, February 7, 2003 
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visit relatives and friends”. On the political front, Chinese authorities 
have noticed that “since 1995, Bhutan had supported China in defeating 
anti-China drafts at the UNHR Conference”. On the Taiwan question, 
Beijing has been praising Thimphu for “supporting one-China policy”36. 
Although limited, relations have been developing recently. From 
1994, Chinese ambassadors to India regularly paid working visits to 
Bhutan and exchanged views with the King and Foreign Minister on 
ways to further develop bilateral relations. In June 2000, Bhutanese 
Ambassador to India visited China. These visits have opened up a new 
channel of contacts other than the boundary talks. Other occasions have 
also been used to deepen mutual understanding in religious, cultural, 
political and technical fields. In 1990, Bhutan sent a delegation to take 
part in the 11th Asian Games held in Beijing. In 1995, Bhutanese Princess 
Sonam Choden Wangchuck attended the 4th World Women Conference 
held in Beijing. In July 2001, a delegation led by the Bhutanese Foreign 
Secretary visited Beijing and other places in China. So did the speaker of 
Bhutan’s National Assembly who attended the conference for peace of 
the Asian parliaments held in Beijing and Chongqing in April 2002. At 
this occasion, he visited different places in China, including Tibet. 
Exchanges have also developed at the experts level. Bhutanese experts 
recently attended seminars in China in fields like security and 
development of small hydropower. Chinese experts have been visiting 
Bhutan to identify sectors of co-operation in disaster management and 
environment conservation audit policy. 
 
Sino-Bhutanese trade is very small. In 2002, China’s export and 
import from Bhutan amounted only to US$ 637.000 including US$ 
616.000 for Chinese exports.37 38. Co-operation in areas such as culture 
and education have not started yet. In 2001 China offered to provide 
government scholarships to Bhutan, but Bhutanese students still have to 
learn Chinese. In 2000, the two governments reached agreement on 
preserving the Bhutanese honorary consulate in China’s Macao Special 
Administration Region, but individual exchanges remain minimal. 
 
                                                          
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, official web-site 
(www.fmprc.gov.cn). 
37 Sources: China Customs Administration, Beijing.  
38 Trade even decreased of 60,6% from 2002 to 2001. In 2001, China’s export and import from 
Bhutan amounted to US$ 1,62 millions, including US$ 1,60 millions for Chinese exports. As a 
comparison trade between China and Nepal amounted to US$ 153,21 millions in 2001, and US$ 
119,37 millions in 2002. (Sources: China Statistical Yearbook. National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, China Statistics Press, Beijing, 2002.6. )  
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Perspectives and Challenges 
There is no doubt that the process that started in 1984 will 
eventually result in establishing diplomatic ties between Bhutan and 
China. Both sides agree that reaching this step will depend on the solving 
of the border question. The Indian factor will also remain a key element 
in Bhutan’s China policy. While Bhutan and China have common interest 
in the normalisation of their bilateral relations, their perspectives remain 
different. 
China would like to normalise its relations with Bhutan as soon as 
possible, as shown by its acceptance in overcoming its neighbour’s 
setbacks while discussing border issues. From China’s point of view, 
resuming trade with Bhutan is part of an overall strategy in the 
Himalayas, which has been framed in the global context of the 
development of China’s western provinces. The resumption of trans-
Himalayan trade is a key element of that strategy. China has already 
border trade with Nepal. During Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee’s recent visit to Beijing39, China and India signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Expanding Border Trade. According 
to this MoU, both countries agreed to open trading posts on the Sikkim-
Tibet border through the Nathu-la Pass. This has been a long awaited 
decision that could have important consequences on the whole region 
including on neighbouring Bhutan.  
This MoU is a first step. China has not formally recognised the 
incorporation of Sikkim into India and the resuming of border trade will 
take time. It is too early to predict all its implications. On the long term, 
Gantkok would be probably better located than Thimphu or Paro to 
become a trade hub should trans-Himalayan trade resume on a large 
scale in the region. Yet, the reopening of a trading post on the Sikkim-
Tibet border will have impact on Sino-Bhutan relations. Historically the 
Kalimpong-Lhasa trade route and its extension to the port of Calcutta 
                                                          
39 Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a six days official visit to China in June 2003. 
Several agreements were signed during this visit that attempted to address one of the most crucial 
matters of contention between both countries over the last half a century, their manner of co-
existence in the Tibet-Himalayan region. Among these agreements, one of the most significant is 
the “Memorandum on expanding Border Trade” signed on 23 June 2003. Following is the full text 
of article 1 and article 2 of this MoU:  
- Article 1 “The Indian side agrees to designate Changgu of Sikkim state as the venue 
for border trade market; the Chinese side agrees to designate Renqinggang of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region as the venue for border trade market”. (Renqinggang, also known as 
Rinchengang, is located south of Sharsingma in Yadong counrty.) 
- Article 2: “The two sides agree to use Nathula Pass as the pass for entry and exit of 
persons, means of transport and commodities engaged in border trade. Each side shall establish 
checkpoints at appropriate locations to monitor and manage their entry and exit through the 
Natula Pass.” 
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have generated considerable wealth in Central Tibet and north India. 
Bhutan was at the forefront of this route.  
The reopening of the Yadong area has been listed as a priority in the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005)40. 
Yadong, which is adjacent to Bhutan on the east, used to be the region’s 
largest land port41. The TAR expects an increase by 15% annually of its 
border trade42, when Yadong is reopened. From the Chinese point of 
view, such a move will not only boost the economy in Tibet but will also 
fuel foreign trade in China’s western areas, such as Qinghai and Gansu 
provinces and the Xinjiang Ugyur Autonomous Region. Currently, 
exports from these areas to South Asian countries have to go through 
Guangzhou or Hong Kong. Through Yadong, the transportation distance 
will be shortened by more than 9,000 km. There are direct roads linking 
Yadong and India’s seaport Gandhinagar, which could facilitate imports 
and exports from China’s western provinces to South-east Asia and 
European countries. The Lhasa-Kalimpong trade route is about one third 
shorter than the Lhasa-Kathmandu axis that currently links Tibet with 
South Asia and it is geographically more easily accessible. With the 
opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, Yadong is expected to play an even 
more important role in the development of China’s western areas. To 
prepare for the opening, the TAR has planned to invest 6 billion yuan 
(US$726 million) in improving the road from Shigatse to Yadong during 
the Plan.  
On the Indian side, Sikkim has been drumming up support to press 
New Delhi to reopen its historic route to Tibet. The local government 
welcomed the MoU recently signed in Beijing. The Sikkim Chamber of 
Commerce feels exports to Tibet could touch 10 billion rupees (US$ 203 
million) from the current figure of zero once the trade corridor is open43. 
Trade will probably start modestly. Sikkim will trade mainly in 
vegetables, oils and household items, which are in great demand in Tibet. 
Yet the move is widely expected to start a new chapter in Sino-Indian 
                                                          
40 "Tibet plans to reopen land port in Yadong. Region aims to use border trade to fuel economy", 
China Daily, May 23, 2001, Beijing 
41 Yadong is the Chinese name both for Dromo country in the TAR, and this country capital 
known as Sharsingma in Tibetan. The Yadong country comprises the valley of the Amo-chu (or 
Dromo Machu) River, also known in neighbouring Sikkim as the Chumbi valley, and the parallels 
valleys of its more westerly tributaries, that converge at Sharsingma, before flowing into the Haa 
district of West Bhutan. It is strategically located on the old trading route linking Tibet to Paro in 
West Bhutan via Tremo La pass, and the various westerly trails, which penetrate the Dongkya 
range to enter Sikkim. The area has been closed in 1962. 
42 In 2000 Tibet registered a border trade volume worth US$110 million (78,5% of the total regional 
foreign trade). 
43 Reopening of corridor to Tibet boosts Indian state’s prospects. Pratap Chakravarty. AFP, June 
27, 2003 
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trade. It potentially means a global boost for local economies in the TAR 
and northeast India.  
The resuming of trans-Himalayan trade between Tibet and Sikkim 
will not have immediate consequences for Bhutan, at least on the short 
term. It is very unlikely that the old Bhutan-Tibet trade pattern would re-
emerge. As noted by Leo. E. Rose in 1974, “a whole new Bhutanese trade 
pattern has emerged since 1960, based upon ready access to India as both 
a market and a source of supply, and any change in this trade structure 
would be highly disruptive to Bhutan’s economy. The removal of the 
embargo with Tibet, therefore, would have at best a limited impact of 
Bhutan’s trade system, except possibly in the sparsely populated but 
highly strategic northern border areas”44. Although these remarks remain 
valid, the situation has changed since the 70s, mainly in Tibet. The case of 
Outer Mongolia, which economy has been partly reoriented towards 
China after the collapse of the USSR, shows that Chinese products can 
rapidly spread on a new market. In the case of Bhutan, such a pattern 
would imply the building of roads on Bhutan’s underdeveloped northern 
border areas. China would probably be ready to finance such projects as 
it did in Nepal. However, it is unlikely that Bhutan would consider this 
option, at least in the current context. In any case, the resuming of border 
trade with China, would allow landlocked Bhutan to have new and 
promising economic perspectives. As a matter of fact, Bhutan will have to 
assess the potential consequences for its own economy of the recently 
signed Sino-Indian MoU on border trade. 
As the number of Chinese visitors in Tibet has been increasing 
dramatically for a few years45, Chinese tourism in Bhutan could also 
become an option as part of the growing interest of China for its 
neighbour. As a matter of fact, Chinese media are starting to unveil the 
charms of Bhutan to the Chinese public who largely ignores even the 
existence of the Kingdom.46
Another aspect to be considered in Bhutan’s China policy concerns 
the resumption of religious links between Bhutanese and Tibetan 
monasteries. As noticed earlier there was no political dimension in the 
traditional relationship that existed in ancient times between the 
Gelugpa-dominated theocracy in Tibet and the Drukpa in Bhutan. Yet, 
various exchanges had existed through times, via pilgrimages, 
                                                          
44 Leo E. Rose, 95. 
45 Tibet received 850,000 visitors in 2002, up nearly 25 percent from the previous year. The 
increase was largely due to a significant rise in the number of domestic visitors, who numbered 
720,000 in 2002 (Tibet Tourism Bureau) 
46 An example can be found in a rather extensive article (2 pages) that was recently published in 
the Nan Fang Zhou Mo (South Week-end) ) under the title “Budan: Yun Zhong De Guo Du” (Bhutan: 
the country in the middle of the clouds), p. 30-31, 2003-3-27 
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reincarnations who were discovered indifferently in Bhutan or Tibet, 
retreats in monasteries, and visits of great lamas. Apart from the trade 
embargo, the closing of the border in 1962, meant also a religious 
embargo on Tibet. Moreover, all family links that existed between 
Bhutanese and Tibetans have been put aside. It is somehow surprising 
when travelling to Bhutan, to feel and to be so close to Tibet and to realise 
that the younger generations, who never had the opportunity to travel to 
Tibet, have little knowledge of their northern neighbour which has 
become a foreign land. 
China is willing to “welcome Bhutanese friends to China to make 
pilgrimages or to visit relatives and friends”47. The resuming of religious 
exchanges between monasteries, assuming that they would remain under 
the strict control of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission in Lhasa 
would be in the interest of the Chinese side, that could illustrate its 
“policy of freedom of religion in Tibet”. The resuming of contacts has 
already started between Buddhist in Bhutan and China. In 2001 the Dorje 
Lopen, the second higher-ranking lama of the Drukpa sect visited Wutai 
Shan in Shanxi province and Emei Shan in Sichuan province, two of 
China’s sacred Buddhist sites, on the invitation of the Chinese Ministry of 
Culture. For the time being, Tibet has remained out of the picture, but 
Bhutanese lamas could easily be invited to visit the TAR, like several lay 
officials who have already been invited. 
 
As a matter of fact the relations between Bhutan and Tibet go far 
beyond the religious issue. It should be noted that while the question of 
Taiwan is described by both sides as points of common view, Tibet is not 
even mentioned in official communiqués. The RGOB has probably to find 
a balance, at least in terms of communication, between its attachment to 
the Tibetan culture, and the need to develop a mature relation with the 
PRC. Bhutanese officials, including the Foreign Minister who travelled to 
Lhasa in October 2002, have already been invited to visit Tibet. Chinese 
media regularly use these visits to demonstrate the positive aspects of 
China's Tibet policy, assuming that Bhutanese visitors are best qualified 
to judge the situation of Tibetans in terms of socio-cultural 
development48. No doubt that China would like to use Bhutan 
                                                          
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, official web-site 
48 In April 2002, Dasho Ugyen Dorje, the Speaker of Bhutan's National Assembly, while visiting 
Tibet for the first time, was quoted by the People's Daily in the following terms: "Dorje said Tibet 
had seen great changes with the support of the central government. He learnt that the Tibetan 
people were satisfied with their current lifestyle. He said that he saw with his own eyes that the 
Tibetan people were benefiting greatly from the central government's special care. He was 
surprised and excited by what he had seen which was completely different from what he had 
been led to expect." (People's Daily, April 25, 2002). 
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assessment on Tibet as a "moral caution" of its own policy in the TAR. 
Such orientation will need careful consideration in Thimphu.  
 
Conclusion 
Although Bhutan would not explore the possibility of using the PRC 
to balance the influence of India, the Kingdom has obvious interest in 
normalising its relations with China. Yet, Bhutan’s China policy has 
limited objectives, at least on the short term. Securing a comprehensive 
agreement on the boundary question is a priority for the RGOB. In that 
context, its primary concern is with the settlement of those issues, which 
have the potential of causing tension on the northern border.  
Apprehension over the ultimate objectives of Chinese policy in the 
Himalayan region has not disappeared in Bhutan. This view however 
seems largely based on India’s own apprehension over Chinese 
intentions. Although they are not technically linked, discussions on the 
Sino-Bhutanese border and negotiations on the Sino-Indian border are 
politically related. In that context the general improvement in Sino-
Indian relations and the success of Indian Prime Minister’s recent visit to 
China contribute to the process of confidence building in the whole 
region49. Meanwhile, the annual border talks and the development of 
several interactions between Bhutan and China has been creating a 
favourable context that could turn into a complete normalisation of their 
relationship as soon as the regional situation allows it. 
As seen in the context of Mr Vajpayee’s visit to China, the pressure 
has been high on India to adopt a less defensive attitude towards its 
border relations with China. Officials in Sikkim have been pressing the 
national government in New Delhi to change its mind set because of the 
prevailing military tranquillity on the Sino-Indian frontiers since 1967 
and re-activate the Sikkim-Tibet trade route. It is considered in Gangtok 
that border trade will be a powerful instrument to resolve poverty and 
unemployment, both of which are factors in this insurgency-wracked 
region. The lifting of the Indian trade embargo over Tibet will be a major 
step. It does not mean however that all factors of tension will be 
removed. Trade between India and China is already irksome with New 
Delhi accusing Chinese entrepreneurs of dumping cheap commodities 
across the border. India will have serious concern about this pattern 
becoming predominant with border trade turning legal. Opening an 
“invasion route” into a region perceived as military vulnerable is still a 
serious concern in India.  
                                                          
49 During Mr. Vajpayee’s visit, India and China announced the appointment of two special 
representatives to progress towards the resolution of the border dispute.  
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Bhutan will have to incorporate all these factors in its China's policy. 
China's objectives in the Himalayas are mainly economical as shown by 
its “Western development strategy”. Yet, political consideration remains 
essential, both internally and externally. Should Beijing succeed, even 
partly, in restoring Tibet as a trading bridge in the Himalayas, the 
geopolitical setting of the whole region would change. Bhutan and Nepal 
would be at the forefront of the Chinese strategy in the region. While 
India is facing instability and political unrest within its own borders, it 
will become more and more tempting for Beijing to offer Thimphu, its 
support, should security problem in southern Bhutan deepen into a 
regional security issue. Although Bhutan would certainly prefer not to be 
entangled in regional politics, the Kingdom will have to invent a 
"Chinese real-politik" of its own. As a landlocked country, Bhutan cannot 
disregard the economical benefits that could result from the resuming of 
its relations with China50. At the same time, pragmatism will prevent 
Thimphu from undermining its relation with New Delhi. An exercise in 
tightrope walking is awaiting Bhutan. While facing a new challenge in 
the growth of its diplomacy, the Kingdom will have to conciliate two 
objectives: asserting its personality on the regional scene and avoiding to 




Agreement between the Government of the people's Republic of China and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan on the Maintenance of Peace and 
Tranquillity Along the Sino-Bhutanese Border Areas (December 8, 1998)51
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Bhutan (hereafter known as “Both sides”), in accordance 
with the five principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs and peaceful co-existence and for the purpose of 
maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Sino-Bhutanese border, have 
reached the following agreements:  
Article 1 
Both sides hold the view that all countries big or small, strong or weak are 
equal and should respect one another. The Chinese side reaffirmed that it 
completely respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
                                                          
50 Bhutan relies heavily on India for its trade. So far, to cope with the absence of trade 
diversification, Bhutan has signed transit agreement with India to preserve free trade and to 
facilitate its trade with third countries like Bangladesh, Thailand, Singapore, Nepal and Hong 
Kong.  
51 Source: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Bhutan. Both sides stand ready to develop their good-neighborly and 
friendly cooperative relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-Existence. 
Article 2 
Both sides are of the view that during the ten rounds of talks that have been 
held so far, they have reached consensus on the guiding principles on the 
settlement of the boundary issues and narrowed their differences on the 
boundary issues in the spirit of mutual accommodation, mutual trust and 
cooperation and through friendly consultations. The mutual understanding 
and traditional friendship between the two countries have been deepened. 
Both sides stand ready to adhere to the above-mentioned spirit and make 
joint efforts for an early and fair solution of the boundary issues between the 
two countries. 
Article 3 
Both sides agreed that prior to the ultimate solution of the boundary issues, 
peace and tranquillity along the border should be maintained and the status 
quo of the boundary prior to March 1959 should be upheld, and not to resort 
to unilateral action to alter the status quo of the border. 
Article 4 
Both sides reviewed the progress made after ten rounds of border talks. As 
both sides have already expounded each other's stand on the disputed areas, 
both sides agreed to settle this issue through friendly consultations. 
Article 5 
This agreement will come into force on the date of signing. 
 
This agreement was signed on December 8, 1998 in Beijing, done in two 
copies in the Chinese, Bhutanese and English languages, all three languages 
are authentic. If differences arise, the English text will be the standard text. 
 
Representative of the Government  Representative of the Government of the  
of the People 's Republic of China    Kingdom of Bhutan. 
